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February 13, 1990
!

The Honorable Gordon R. Hall
Chief Justice
Utah State Supreme Court
332 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

.• _rf - -':

lei,

.y

FEB 1 A 19^0

UDOT vs. Ogden, et al.
Case No. 890173

Dear Mr. Chief Justice:
With respect to the above referenced matter, please
find ten copies of the following documents from the trial court:
1.

Findings and Conclusions (consolidated cases);

2.

Supplement
to
Findings
(consolidated cases);

3.

Order Fixing Valuation Date and
Payment of Interest (Ogden case);

Providing
^

for

4.

Order Fixing Valuation Date and
Payment of Interest (Lind case);

Providing

for

5.

Order Fixing Valuation Date and Providing
Payment of Interest (Springer case); and

for

6.

Order Fixing Valuation Date and
Payment of Interest (LAYGO case).

for

and

Conclusions

Providing

At the time of oral argument the Court indicated that
these documents had not been submitted.
Yours very truly,
OLSEN, MclFF & CHAMBERLAIN

By
KC:sb
Ends.

l

Y^h%m

Ken Chamberlain

KEN
CHAMBEBlJMti
TEX R . OLSEN

Attorneys for Defendants Orj^en,
Lind, Laygo, Springer
225 North 100 East
F. 0. Box 100
Richfield, Utah
84701
Teler-hone: Q01 896-5441
}.M THE S l A i i i -.'TJDICIA'. '...-., i S< - .' ;

•

•-' t Prt COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

vs
WALTER M. OGDEN AND SONS,
INC., and SEVIER COUNTY
TREASURER,
Civi

Defendant.

86-8-9H> •

vs.
hVJC

his wife, Trustor; CORPORATION
OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST CF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, Beneficiar', :
and SEVIER COUNTY TREASURER/
Civil No. 10128
Defendant.
vs.
LAYGO COMPANY, a partnership
CHRISTIE RICHARDS, JANICE
PARKER, LEANE JARRETTE, and
JEAN YOUNG,
Civil No. 10132
Defendant.

2

vs.
J. D. SPRINGER,

Civil No, 10131
Defendant,

Pursuant to the stipulation of all counsel the abovereferenced matters came before the Court, sitting without a jury,
beginning Thursday, March 9, 1989, and continuing through Monday,
March 13.
The four cases were informally consolidated for hearing
on motions filed by each of the Defendants requesting the Court
to

fix a valuation date other than the date of service of

summons.

Further, the petitions requested the Court to require

payment of interest from the valuation date fixed by the Court
rather than the date the Orders of Immediate Occupancy were
entered.
The Court has carefully considered the evidence adduced
during the three days of hearings and has further considered the
extensive memoranda filed and the cases cited therein, including
particularly the Utah cases which have dealt with the valuation
date as well as payment of interest.
In order to properly treat the Defendants' motions the
Court is called upon to make factual findings, legal rulings and
to resolve several mixed questions of law and fact.

No effort

has been made to compartmentalize these.
With the foregoing introduction the Court finds and
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concludes as follows, to-wit:
1.

The

Court

concludes

that

the

constitutional

requirement of "just compensation" set forth in Article I, §22 of
the Utah Constitution takes precedence over §78-34-9 & 11, and
that the latter cannot be strictly applied if such application
would undermine the constitutional requirement.
2.

The

Court

concludes

that

§78-34-11

creates

a

rebuttable presumption that the date for determining valuation in
eminent domain cases is the date of service of process.

In

reaching this conclusion the Court has relied upon and is in
agreement with the opinion of Justice Stewart in Utah State Road
Comfn vs. Fribera, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984).
3.

After carefully considering all of the evidence

adduced the Court finds and concludes that if the trier of fact
were required to value Defendants' properties as of the date of
service of

summons

it would not lead to an award of "just

compensation" as required by the constitution.
4.

The Court concludes that June 22, 1977, should be

the date of valuation in these cases.

This is the date when the

Environmental Impact Statement was officially approved by federal
authorities

and

the

general

corridor west

of Richfield

and

through these Defendants1 properties was finally selected,
5.

The Court finds that there is a close relationship

between the date the corridor was officially selected on June 22,
1977, and the time frame in which these Defendants' properties
could reasonably have expected to have developed or to have been
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sold for potential development purposes absent the impact of the
interstate.
6.

Based

on

the

Courtfs

careful

reading

of

t he

Friberg decision and its consideration of precedents in other
jurisdictions, and after carefully evaluating all of the evidence
introduced, the Court determines that June 22, 1977 is the date
which is most likely to insure fundamental fairness in keeping
with the constitutional mandate of just compensation.
7.

Defendants own property within the corridor of

Interstate Highway 70, and were served with summons in eminent
domain proceedings on or about the following dates:

8.

a.

Laygo - October 15, 1987.

b.

Lind - October 12, 1987.

c.

Ogden - August 19, 1986.

d.

Springer - October 7, 1937.

Orders of Immediate Occupancy were entered under

the following dates:

9.

a.

Laygo - October 28, 198 7

b.

Lind - October 28, 1987

c.

Ogden - September 10, 1986

d.

Springer - October 28, 198 7

Interstate Highway 70 runs from Washington, D.C.

on the east to its merger with Interstate Highway 15 near Cove
Fort, and thence to Los Angeles.

With the exception noted below

the final segment of some three thousand miles of this interstate
is being constructed immediately west of Richfield City, Sevier
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County, Utah, where Defendant's property is located,
10.

Additional lanes are being completed in a remote

stretch between Fremont Junction in Emery County and Green River,
Utah, though the corridor was acquired and the Interstate has
been opened in that area for many years.
11.

There

is

evidence

indicating

that

this

last

construction west of Richfield was a result of the desire of
Richfield City so that the businessmen could get the advantage of
the business going through the City,

However, it was not at the

request of these property owners and the effects upon these
property owners and the businessmen are entirely different.
12.

As

a

immediate

occupancy

appraised

values

of

prerequisite
the
the

to

Plaintiff

entry

of

tendered

properties

being

the
into

orders of
cunt

taken.

its

Shortly

thereafter these deposited funds were withdrawn by the respective
Defendants.
13.

The Defendants do not challenge the right or the

necessity of the taking and have raised no defenses relating
thereto.

Rather

Defendants

challenge

the

adequacy

of

the

compensation which the Plaintiff has tendered.
14.

The Court holds that Defendants1 withdrawal of the

funds deposited by the Plaintiff did not constitute a waiver or
abandonment of their right f o question the appropriate date of
valuation.

The Court is of the opinion that the valuation date

is a matter relating to compensation and not a defense to the
taking.

Accordingly the Court determines that §78-34-9 as it
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Reaper,
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c.

Richfield

Reaper,

December

1,

1977:

7
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1990s,
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well
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J

f.e
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* e

s i-:-ot

announcement.
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and

Sevier Valley,
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o]:d Richfield's
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•
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northwest
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4
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" --.c

'->nf incd area between the west
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.

•
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was required to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement before
the route
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21.

be selected.
On the 18th day of Karrh, 197/, tne hnvii unint'iital

Iir.r.art 5": i -- ^,r-nt was ccr.rlet^d, <"^d * he west Richfield
was officially
was

approved

thereafter

.= *M

1

,<*

*

in the following e d i f i e s

23.

the

Federal

-jsi, a i Mjnmeni

a1

UIKJ

through the property of these

ii i de

]97fiif March .

by

C« — • -

It
Highway

'^
.,:

J^.»

!•

approved

-

Select

side of Richfield
received

..e *

officially

Admin i si j .if i i m
22,

_y

alignment

"' «•- \h

•
^

1
.

Defendants

front-page newspaper articles

the Richfieia Rea* * t ,
*

in »= ; est

December 2,

/•
I. •

11 f f i r i a l

*•;P 1 e<• t i n n ,

the

8
' •• *r
h e f o> <*~* r «,e ,4, t ;a .

<*•

•;•**"

*• finalized
i

•-

- * 1 location w a s published

uf filial
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Reaper,
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24,

-Mchfiold

City has h^d

i p^liry

,: a o lining

.!_ r-rr;o • , \ • <•r - t : r v:t v!*"hin the proposed interstate

corridor
f

as is evidenced by • ^e U w ,owing t^--o . < . , j .
Woody Farnsworth in UDOT v s . Partington, S, vier < iv11
The

following

tost i mon/ w.rs receivrd

-

, * i<-. 9 .

in evidence pursuant

to

*< A ' • *,,ui-

i-t i pulat i on, but with the proviso that th,p Cit-y is «.-.
*•

;er

' uuia the btaLe and is not control led thereby:
Q. Thank you very much. u>.-. g your years of
--perience with the city, :.^ting back into
1970s with the City Council ~nd the
b a n n i n g Commission, has the city had a
/ . . ^ M I policy toward the interstate highway?

< * *'

* w*t policy been?

A. Generally, it consisted with not approving
or allowing development around the fret.ay or
freeway 1ano. [Farnsworth transcript p.19,]
25.
declining

'

to

' ;':*iiJ iff " is c.n< o^ra-jod the rity's p^ 1 : o? of

approve-

o>, ... ; ^ o ;

4i

: • :—3

^-titn

corridor.
Ri«'.!v c ".

26.
residential

>^ orirr.*od

construction

b^gluni,,;

contir.oi-'i through the decade.
i -. •« • • ;,»

was a

2".
F

•:

r

•-""• -

substanti *.,r
1987.
p.r

The f a u
"

dramatic

- .*, tN? y*-a."

*

t groun^

:

.:hore

residential

„ •

3

i^velop:nent

higher

-pw, c; finding r-pplio

d

^instruction.

market vali:«

/• J- pin f suitable

*n

-

:

Beginning
M--:--

n-von

was
~t

to

t ano

*: ,^*~

.;*

-djaoenv
'uadrant

where

* -veloped

Jefendants 1

10
properties ^ ^e y. ocated .
^i>regoing
Court

i plies

f*-t(,ts

n- t

:ty

. comparable

relevant

income

determinat

a •

wing

capitalization

appraising:

n the

*' J -r. r ^-^^

apprcaoh
41

Richfield

City evidencing reduction in i he noud !'ur h-^Iui^q ,.'ts.
i "- roa^-d • '"^*
the cost
s%

;

subdivision improvements.

: i L/ictn» * ^g to a wnu' .

• i

C

:?

he increase in
<

..

!

s

. vledge, v ^ i r i a l l y taken, * t tho economic down--ui-i . . he

rntire CG <2 9 osr-.a ^ 1 . 1 he

^ iV K

.*

i ^ \r ,zc: i

- i-. f- * y , ^ tueie iias h »?n reduced activ'. / * r. l.**nd vlovelopment
-ird h«"?e construction *hA /. • , i . • «
of land. i n general.

.

•• K t

'in

The evidence supported these facts of which

tl le Coi lr t - -<.-- •' - r " v
29.

During

Iht- Uhds

the 19*05,

and the I o'u * , I ho.

overwhelr; r.7 -,--?;T-- -, f resi ie-t ihi 1 growth
northwest ::•.•-> * 1
30.

The

- •• s

": Richfield v.:o- • :• he

• • • t * :• s.

residential

yi.^wWi

t /^.ii J

t^e

!.•..*,. ... ~

i

t ,.••!'•:.! Defendants' properties continued m t i l the 19 '-l^'p time
frar.e

wl.^n there

W-I.J;

.1 JI.IHM

*

" ^ewher<~

principally

toward the southwest, with a lesser amount of development
northeast.

\&

The Court finds this w a s caused by the interstate

designation.
31,
approximately

Beginning in 1950 and continuing through ^id 1977
>u'l

1 I In

.1 ifnl iv i s i ons

nuwly

approved

w* where

11
substantial

development

occurred

was

located

^u^

in

extreme

nor thwest per *• i n>n ->f P i <:h f ield Ci t'y adjacent Lo or approaching
the property of those Defendants,
J?,
of

the

Subsequent to mid 1977 only some approximately 1 0%

subdivisioi is

development

ni«wl;(

occurred were

.ipprovprl

located

m

in

\

JII substantial

ir. -ie northwest

portion

Richf iold ''•ty,
*) 1.

The

shitt

t loin

the

northwest

port ion

commun.'**; <o other areas occurred when the natural growth t.. </4 is
r * -i .• .

•,(-.' proximity In I li

interstate corridor, the location

'', f v h i c h w a s w I d e 1 y k n o w n ,

34,
altered

The

loi ig

residential

impending

construction

estab] :l si led

development

grow th

from, moving

of

the

iu\ l.tei ns

interstate

and

precluded

.MI I o i lie lands of these

Defr •-? .:,• - ,
35.

The

Com t

: . ..

: • *

intprst^te tu*e subject properties had residential potent, 3 *! :* th
v , , .;
purpose

.-•*.'
j

ruling

Defendants as

WPII

juiy iv i b; l H " r IN

*
<.n

-

'his iinding

«'he pend;ng

^

^<y

^ • < <• o

motions

as the Plaintiff is entitled to present to a
i '"• ihc'ity »'»'"frhn hiniw^ t- and b<rist iir-e fro which

the various properties could have been put absent tne i in i IM.MH 'e
of the interstate,
3*
reasonable
e ^ -: r

T .
access
, :

;< —
':

* ,

tiiities,
• - axe

\ncludij.o

-*

;

-

-

"

i

we
.-w^r,

reasonably proximate

to

12
attractive neighborhoods in the highest area rf residential zone
classification

in Richfield

City and

in that

sector of the

community wherein most of the public parks, schools, churches and
athletic fields exist.

Further the subject properties are toward

higher elevations vhirh have been attractive to home builders in
communities throughout Utah.
17,

stoppage

of

the

northwest

residential

growth

pattern is related to the anticipated location of the interstate
and not to the canal located in that area.

The canal could be

breached and had been breached before whenever desired by the
City.

Specifically, high quality residential

development had

spawned above the canal in close proximity to the property of
these

Defendants

and

outside

of

the

designated

interstate

corridor.
38.

In the absence of the Interstate highway, there

are no legal obstacles to the annexation to Richfield City and/or
zone changes on any of Defendants1 properties.
39.
indicating

E.-ich of the Defendants has performed overt acts

a design to use their properties

for

residential

purposes.
40.

it

would

have .served no useful

purpose for these

Defendants to have undertaken to further plat or develop their
properties when they had full Icnowledge the properties would be
taken for the interstate highway and when K irhfielcl «"*ity had a
policy against any development within the contemplated corridor.
Equity does not require the performance of useless acts.

13
41.

Subsequent to the corridor selection on June 22,

1977 there were modest shifts of the actual right-of-way lines
and there was also a repositioning of the interchanges on b<i>th
the north

and south

ends of Richfield.

The west Richfield

alignment however remained firmly designated from the time of its
official selection until commencement of condemnation proceedings
against these Defendants some 10 years later and some 30 years
after the initial announcement of the freeway project ,
42.

The right-of-way and interchange shifting, as well

as the failure to finalize the design, did not reduce, but rather
augmented the injury to the Defendant landowners, and extended
the period of uncertainty during which their ability to exercise
the incidents of property ownership was severely limited.
43.

The Court does not rely on a concept of fault or

blame, but finds that there was "undue protraction . . . of the
condemnation process11 within the meaning of the Friberg decision
(at 830).

For whatever reason it has taken the Plaintiff over

thirty years to complete the project, the protraction has worked
to the significant injury of the Defendant landowners.

The Court

sees no distinction between "undue protraction" after: the filing
of suit, as in Friberg, and "undue protraction11 before the filing
of suit.

The matter of ultimate consequence is the undeimining

of each Defendant landowners constitutional

right to receive

just compensation.
44.

The

interstate

highway

created

-

condition

precluding the development of Defendants1 properties or the sale

14
thereof for immediate or future development,
45.

As a practical matter these Defendants could not

have developed their property nor sold it a fair price for tlle
purpose of development.

They were obliged to just hold their

properties and pay the taxes on them until condemnation occurred.
46.

Because condemnation has occurred, the Defendants

have lost the opportunity to retain their lands until market
conditions improve.
4 7,

Even under Plaintiff's view of the evidence there

has been a marked

decline

in the market value of potential

subdivision land within or in reasonable proximity to Richfield
City.

Under Plaintiff's view of the evidence, market value

peaked

sometime

in

between

19 7 7

condemnation actions were commenced.

a nd

1986 87

when

these

Plaintiff claimed the value

peaked during or about 1980 and that the 1977 and 1986-87 values
are comparable.

Plaintiff claims thereby a failure to meet the

requirement

the

of

Friberg

decision

which

refers

to

a

"substantial difference" in value between the date of service of
summons and the date of valuation being considered.
48.

The Court does not accept Plaintiff's view of the

evidence, having determined that ma/ket: -value would have been
substantially higher in 1977 than in 1986-87.

More importantly,

the facts as advanced by Plaintiff, even i £ true, would not cure
the injustice to these Defendants.

Under such a siti nation they

would be chained to their land while the market went up and then
back down.

Both sides concur that ih- r-.rV.--t 7 s now down.

15
49.

The Defendants have met the burden of overcoming

the statutory presumption, tl lat the valuation date be fixed on the
date

summons is served.

This date would

not

lead to just

compensation,
50.

The Court further determines that the Defendants

are entitled to recover interest at the statutory rate of 81 from
and after the elate fixed for valuation.
22,

1911,

forward

each

of

the

At all tiroes from June

Defendants

was

effectively

precluded from exercising important incidents of ownership over
their lands and were obliged to abandon all but the most nominal
kind of use*

None of the Defendants received any return on thfir

property between June 22, 1977 and the date of institution of the
condemnation actions.
the Lind home.

A likely exception exists with respect to

While its marketability would have been severely

limited there may have been usage value to its owner.

The Court

reserves jurisdiction regarding the application of interest visa-vis the rental value thereof.
51.

In determining to impose interest the Court has

considered the statute which provides for interest only frura i he
date of service of summons, or from the date of actual occupancy
(§78-34-y).

While: this statute may be constitutionally sound in

the overwhelming number of cases, its application under the fact's
of

these

cases

compensation,

and

would

deprive

therefore

constitutional requirement.

would

these
be

Defendants
in

violation

of

just
the

In this connection the Court notes

the Friberg language to the effect that "just compensation means

16
that the owners must be put in as good a position money wise as
they would ft .we occupied had their property not been taken.11
Further, the Court is aware of decisions of the Utah Supreme
Court which predate the Friberq decision and which have strictly
applied §7 8-3 4-9 regarding the payment of interest.

Specifically

the Court has considered City of South Oaden vs. Fuiiki, 621 P. 2d
1254 (Utah 1980) and State vs. Peek, 1 U.2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630
(Utah 1953).

While Fuiiki was cited jn Friberg. the interest

issue was not faced since the valuation date was moved forward.
The Court is of the opinion that these cases have not fully come
to grips with the constitutional requirement of ;nst compensation
and

also with the constitutional

concept enunciated by the

United States Supreme Court in United States vs. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 at 261.

In that case the Court stated:

It is the owners loss, not the taker's gain
which is the measure of the value of the
property taken.
52.
substantial^

As

heretofore

noted,

similar market value

Plaintiff

claims

a

in 1977 and 1986-87, but

claims a substantially higher market value during the interim.
If

the

Court

declining

were

to accept

this

evidence

*o rhar.ge the valuation date, or

as a basis for
for declining to

require payment of interest, then Defendants would be put in 1 he
untenable position of having their land held hostage for 10 years
while the market went UJD an down without a i: easonable opportunity
to sell at fair value and without any return on the property
during the interim.

To award Defendants the same compensation 10

17
years later without interest would not be just.

As noted by the

Friberg court:
The
constitutional
requirement
of
just
compensation derives Mas much content from
the basic equitable principles of fairness as
it does from technical concepts of property
law . • . [at 828] [Emphasis added]

DATED this

DON V; TIBBS
DISTRICT COURT/JUDGE

\

AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING

->

. hereby cei'tify that a full, true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing FINDINGS AND CONCUDSIONS was placed in
the United

States mail

at Richfield,

postage thereon fully prepai ; i..-.

Utah, with

first-class

* -5 <- ~^—day of March, 1989,

addressed as follows:
Mr. Stephen C. Ward
Attorney for Plaintiff,
UDOT vs. Ogden, UDOT vs. Lind
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84 114
Mr. Alan S. Bachman
Attorney for Plaintiff,
UDOT vs. Laygo, UDOT vs. Springer
124 State Capitol

Salt Lake City # Utah

n!/.

84III 4

KEN CHAMBERLAIN
TEX R. OLSEN
Attorneys for Defendants Ogden,
Lind, Laygo, Springer
225 North 100 East
P. 0. Box 100
Richfield, Utah
84 7 01
Telephone: 801 896-5441
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff,

SUPPLEMENT TO FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS

WALTER M. OGDEN AND SONS,
INC., and SEVIER COUNTY
TREASURER,
Civil No, 86-8-98 37
Defendant.
vs,
RULON LIND and FLORA S. LIND,
his wife, Trustor; CORPORATION
OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS,Beneficiary;
and SEVIER COUNTY TREASURER,
Civil No. 10128
Defendant.
vs.
LAYGO COMPANY, a partnership,
CHRISTIE RICHARDS, JANICE
PARKER, LEANE JARRETTE, and
JEAN YOUNG,
Civ I I No
Defendant.

10112

2

vs,
J. D. SPRINGER,
Civil No. 10131
Defendant*

Pursuant

1 o 1 ho objections

filed by Plaintiff, the

Court supplements its Findings and Conclusions in the following
particulars:
The fifty-two numbered paragraphs set forth in the
Court's Findings and Conclusions are divided into the following
catagories:
Findings of Fact:
Paragraph number 5,
Paragraph number 7,
Paragraph number 8,
Paragraph number 9,
Paragraph number 10
Paragraph number 11
Paragraph number 12
Paragraph number 13
Paragraph number 15
Paragraph number 17
Paragraph number 18
Paragraph number 19
Paragraph number 20
Paragraph number 21
Paragraph number 22
Paragraph number 23
Paragraph number 24
Paragraph number 25
Paragraph number 26
Paragraph number 27
Paragraph number 28
Paragraph number 29
Paragraph number 30
Paragraph number 31
Paragraph number 32
Paragraph number 3 3
Paragraph number 34
Paragraph number 35

3
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
b.

number
number
number
number
number
number
number
number
number

36,
37,
38,
39,
41,
42,
44,
45,
46.

Mixed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law:
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
c.

3,
4,
6/
16,
40,
43,
47,
48,
49,
50,
52.

Conclusions of Law:
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph
Paragraph

2.

number
number
number
number
number
number
number
number
number
number
number

number
number
number
number

1,
2,
14,
51.

With respect to Plaintiff's objection numbered 36,

the Court enters the following additional conclusions of law
which are assigned the numbers which chronologically follow the
Findings and Conclusions previously entered:
53.

The Court holds that the Governmental Immunity Act

[63-30-1] is inapplicable.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held

that the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act
serve to give notice to the affected governmental entity so that
it can promptly investigate and remedy defects before additional
injury is caused.

The acts negatively impacting these Defendants

4
properties were instigated by the Plaintiff, and its knowledge
and awareness were at all times superior to the knowledge of the
landowners.

Compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act would

have served no useful purpose under the facts of these cases and
would likely have been counterproductive since the relevant facts
were still in a state of development.
54.
insure

The Court concludes that the proper approach to

compliance

with

the

constitutional

mandate

of

just

compensation in a case involving the unique facts present here is
for the Court to consider the proper valuation date after all the
operative facts are known and the condemning agency institutes
action.

This approach is preferable to the premature institution

of condemnation proceeding whether they be instituted by the
condemning agency, or by the injured landowner in an inverse
condemnation action.

The Court is mindful of the Supreme Court

ruling in Salt Lake County vs. Rarooselli, 567 P. 2d 182 (Utah
1977), and also of the legislature's adoption of
1981.
indicate

The Ramoselli
the

opinion

inappropriate

as well

nature

proceedings by whomever commenced.

of

as

78-34-19 UCA in

the cited

premature

statute

condemnation

In this respect they arguably

support rather than undercut the approach taken by this Court
herein*
DATED this

/?

day of April, 1989.

•

• * . . . . , •

DON V.-TIBBS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing SUPPLEMENT TO FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
was placed in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with
first-class postage thereon fully prepaid on the

/Q

day of

April, 1989, addressed as follows:
Mr. Stephen C. Ward
Attorney for Plaintiff,
UDOT vs. Ogden, UDOT vs. Lind
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114
Mr. Alan S. Bachman
Attorney for Plaintiff,
UDOT vs. Laygo, UDOT vs. Springer
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114

KEN CHAMBERLAIN
TEX R. OLSEN
Attorneys for Defendant Ogden
225 North 100 East
P. O. Box 100
Richfield, Utah
84701
Telephone: 801 896-5441
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WALTER M. OGDEN AND SONS,
INC., and SEVIER COUNTY
TREASURER,
Defendant.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

ORDER FIXING VALUATION
DATE AND PROVIDING FOR
PAYMENT OF INTEREST

Civil No. 86-8-9837

The instant case was informally consolidated with three
other cases1 for the purpose of holding an evidentiary hearing on
motions filed by the Defendants in each of the cases requesting
the Court to fix a valuation date other than the date on which
summons were served.
The Court heard evidence beginning Thursday, March 9,
1989, and continuing through Monday, March 13, 1989.

The Court

has entered extensive Findings and Conclusions and now enters the
1

The companion cases are UDOT vs. Lind et al.. Sevier
Civil No. 10128, UDOT vs. Layqo et al.. Sevier Civil No. 10132,
UDOT vs. J. D. Springer, Sevier Civil No. 10131.
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following order:
1.

The date of valuation in the instant case shall be

June 22, 1977.
2.

Interest at the rate of 8% per annum shall run

from the date of valuation until the date of entry of final
judgment.
3.

Insofar

as

it may be

legally permissable, the

Court determines that this is a final order under Rule 54(b).
4.

The Court determines there is no just reason for

delaying an appeal herein and to the contrary there would be a
great loss in judicial economy if an appeal were not prosecuted
at this time.
5.

In the event

it should

be

determined

that an

appeal does not lie from this order as a matter of right under
Rule

54(b),

then

discretionary
Supreme Court.

the

appeal

Court

pursuant

encourages
to Rule

the

allowance

5, Rules

of a

of the Utah

This Court is of the opinion that this order

involves substantial

rights which

will

materially

effect the

final decision and that an appeal at this stage will better serve
the administration and interests of justice.
DATED this

/f)

day of^terah^ 1989.

*

^

\ -i A J L ^

DON V. T]
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing ORDER FIXING VALUATION DATE AND PROVIDING
FOR PAYMENT OF INTEREST was placed in the United States mail at
Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid
on the

day of March, 1989, addressed as follows:
Mr. Stephen C. Ward
Attorney for Plaintiff,
UDOT vs. Ogden, UDOT vs. Lind
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114
i

KEN CHAMBERLAIN
TEX R. OLSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
225 North 100 East
P. O. Box 100
Richfield, Utah
84701
Telephone: (801) 896-5441
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RULON LIND and FLORA S. LIND, his
wife, Trustor; CORPORATION OF THE
PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
Beneficiary; and SEVIER COUNTY
TREASURER,
Defendant.

:
:
:
:
:
:

ORDER FIXING VALUATION
DATE AND PROVIDING FOR
PAYMENT OF INTEREST

:
:
:
:
:
:
;

Civil No. 10128

The instant case was informally consolidated with three
other cases1 for the purpose of holding an evidentiary hearing on
motions filed by the Defendants in each of the cases requesting
the Court to fix a valuation date other than the date on which
summons were served.
The Court heard evidence beginning Thursday, March 9,
1

The companion cases are UDOT vs. Qgden et al., Sevier
Civil No. 86-8-9837, UDOT vs. Layqo et al.. Sevier Civil No.
10132, UDOT vs. J. D. Springer. Sevier Civil No. 10131.
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1989, and continuing through Monday, March 13, 1989-

The Court

has entered extensive Findings and Conclusions and now enters the
following order:
1.

The date of valuation in the instant case shall be

June 22, 1977.
2.

Interest at the rate of 8% per annum shall run

from the date of valuation until the date of entry of final
judgment.
3.

Insofar

as it may

be legally permissable, the

Court determines that this is a final order under Rule 54(b).
4.

The Court determines there is no just reason for

delaying an appeal herein and to the contrary there would be a
great loss in judicial economy if an appeal were not prosecuted
at this time.
5.

In the

event

it should

be determined

that an

appeal does not lie from this order as a matter of right under
Rule

54(b),

then

discretionary
Supreme Court.

the

appeal

Court

pursuant

encourages
to Rule

the

allowance

5, Rules

of a

of the Utah

This Court is of the opinion that this order

involves substantial

rights which

will materially

effect the

final decision and that an appeal at this stage will better serve
the administration and interests of justice.
DATED this

/fi/^—da^-fif jjarcfry 1989.

,J&
DON V. TI£BS
DISTRICT CODRT-^UDGE
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing ORDER FIXING VALUATION DATE AND PROVIDING
FOR PAYMENT OF INTEREST was placed in the United States mail at
Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid
on the

3C j>~day of March, 1989, addressed as follows:
Mr. Stephen C. Ward
Attorney for Plaintiff,
UDOT vs. Ogden, UDOT vs. Lind
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114

KEN CHAMBERLAIN
TEX R. OLSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
225 North 100 East
P. 0. Box 100
Richfield, Utah
84701
Telephone: (801) 896-5441
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
J. D. SPRINGER,
Defendant.

:
:
:
:
:

ORDER FIXING VALUATION
DATE AND PROVIDING FOR
PAYMENT OF INTEREST

:
:
:

Civil No. 10131

The instant case was informally consolidated with three
other cases1 for the purpose of holding an evidentiary hearing on
motions filed by the Defendants in each of the cases requesting
the Court to fix a valuation date other than the date on which
summons were served.
The Court heard evidence beginning Thursday, March 9,
1989, and continuing through Monday, March 13, 1989.

The Court

has entered extensive Findings and Conclusions and now enters the
following order:
1

The companion cases are UDOT vs. Ogden et a L , Sevier
Civil No. 86-8-9837, UDOT vs. Laygo et al., Sevier Civil No.
10132, UDOT vs. Lind, Sevier Civil No. 10128.
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1.

The date of valuation in the instant case shall be

June 22, 1977.
2.

Interest at the rate of 8% per annum shall run

from the date of valuation until the date of entry of final
judgment.
3.

Insofar as

it may

be legally permissable, the

Court determines that this is a final order under Rule 54 (b) .
4.

The Court determines there is no just reason for

delaying an appeal herein and to the contrary there would be a
great loss in judicial economy if an appeal were not prosecuted
at this time.
5.

In the event

it should

be determined

that an

appeal does not lie from this order as a matter of right under
Rule

54(b),

then

discretionary
Supreme Court.

the

appeal

Court

pursuant

encourages
to Rule

the

allowance

5, Rules

of

a

of the Utah

This Court is of the opinion that this order

involves substantial

rights which

will materially

effect the

final decision and that an appeal at this stage will better serve
the administration and interests of justice.
DATED this

f£

day of

1989.

3
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing ORDER FIXING VALUATION DATE AND PROVIDING
FOR PAYMENT OF INTEREST was placed in the United States mail at
Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid
on the 351^- day of March, 1989, addressed as follows:
Mr, Alan S. Bachman
Attorney for Plaintiff,
UDOT vs. Laygo, UDOT vs. Springer
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114

KEN CHAMBERLAIN
TEX R. OLSEN
A t t o r n e y s f o r Defendant
225 N o r t h 100 East
P. 0 . Box 100

Richfield, Utah
84701
Telephone: (801) 896-5441
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LAYGO COMPANY, a partnership,
CHRISTIE RICHARDS, JANICE
PARKER, LEANE JARRETTE, and
JEAN YOUNG,

:
:
:

ORDER FIXING VALUATION
DATE AND PROVIDING FOR
PAYMENT OF INTEREST

:
:
:
:
Civil No. 10132

Defendant.

:

The instant case was informally consolidated with three
other cases1 for the purpose of holding an evidentiary hearing on
motions filed by the Defendants in each of the cases requesting
the Court to fix a valuation date other than the date on which
summons were served.
The Court heard evidence beginning Thursday, March 9,
1989, and continuing through Monday, March 13, 1989.

1

The Court

The companion cases are UDOT vs. Oqden et al., Sevier
Civil No. 86-8-9837, UDOT vs. Lind et al.. Sevier Civil No.
10128, UDOT vs. J. D. Springer, Sevier Civil No. 10131.
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has entered extensive Findings and Conclusions and now enters the
following order:
1.

The date of valuation in the instant case shall be

June 22, 1977.
2.

Interest at the rate of 8% per annum shall run

from the date of valuation until the date of entry of final
judgment.
3.

Insofar as

it may be legally permissable, the

Court determines that this is a final order under Rule 54(b).
4.

The Court determines there is no just reason for

delaying an appeal herein and to the contrary there would be a
great loss in judicial economy if an appeal were not prosecuted
at this time.
5.

In the event

it should be determined

that an

appeal does not lie from this order as a matter of right under
Rule

54(b),

then

discretionary
Supreme Court.

the

appeal

Court

pursuant

encourages
to Rule

the

allowance

of a

5, Rules of the Utah

This Court is of the opinion that this order

involves substantial

rights which will materially

effect the

final decision and that an appeal at this stage will better serve
the administration and interests of justice.

3
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing ORDER FIXING VALDATION DATE AND PROVIDING
FOR PAYMENT OF INTEREST was placed in the United States mail at
Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid
on the

X 1 ^ day of March, 1989, addressed as follows:
Mr, Alan S. Bachman
Attorney for Plaintiff,
UDOT vs. Laygo, UDOT vs. Springer
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114
i

